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AbstrAct
Biodiversity and its protection are at the centre of  international environ-
mental discussions. The legal regimes set by the Convention of  Biological 
Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol, not yet in force, are aimed to foster the 
protection of  biodiversity through legal distribution of  rights and a regime 
focused on ecosystems, not singular species. However, the tension between 
economically efficient protection and distributive concerns, as well as a com-
plex structure of  entitlements, mitigates the use of  market mechanisms to 
approach a sustainable use of  biodiverse resources. This article proposes the 
evaluation of  the conventional dispositions from an economic perspective, 
as well as the tensions between two predominant legitimating discourses. It 
concludes that the international legal regime in force is not enough to grant 
an efficient use of  biodiverse resources, as well as an optimal standard of  
protection, since it limits the state capabilities to lay down more efficient 
statutes and implement liberal policies.
Keywords: Biodiversity. Convention on Biological Diversity. Nagoya Proto-
col. Genetic resources. Biodiverse resources.
resumo
A biodiversidade e sua proteção estão no centro das discussões ambientais 
internacionais. Os regimes jurídicos postos pela Convenção da Diversidade 
Biológica e pelo Protocolo de Nagoya, este ainda sem vigor, têm o objetivo 
de fomentar a proteção da biodiversidade mediante a distribuição jurídica de 
direitos subjetivos e construção de um regime pautado pela noção de ecos-
sistema, não de espécies isoladas. Não obstante, a tensão entre a proteção 
economicamente eficiente e preocupações distributivas, bem como a estru-
tura complexa das titularidades, mitigam o uso de mecanismos de mercado 
para abordar o uso sustentável de recursos biodiversos. Esse artigo propõe a 
avaliação de disposições convencionais a partir de um viés econômico, bem 
com das tensões entre os dois discursos predominantes de legitimação. Ele 
concluí que o regime jurídico internacional em vigor não é suficiente para 
garantir o uso eficiente dos recursos biodiversos, bom com um padrão ótimo 
de proteção, pois limita a capacidade estatal de estabelecer leis e regulamentes 
mais eficientes, bem como implementar políticas mais liberais.
* Recebido em 13/04/2016
  Aprovado em 28/05/2016
** Professor da Faculdade de Direito da Uni-
versidade de São Paulo (USP) e Pesquisador de 
produtividade do CNPq.
*** Professora da Universidade Tiradentes, 
Doutora em Direito pela Université d’Aix Mar-
seille III, Mestre em Direito pela Universidade 
de Brasília. 
CO
ST
A
, J
os
é 
A
ug
us
to
 F
on
to
ur
a; 
O
LI
V
E
IR
A
, L
iz
ian
e 
Pa
ix
ão
 S
ilv
a. 
K
ill
in
g 
th
e 
gr
ee
n 
go
os
e: 
leg
al 
lim
its
 to
 d
ev
elo
p 
an
d 
se
ll 
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
go
od
s. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
13
, n
. 2
, 2
01
6 
p.
 1
45
-1
58
149
Palavras-chave: Biodiversidade. Convenção da Diver-
sidade Biológica. Protocolo de Nagoya. Recursos gené-
ticos. Recursos biodiversos.
1. IntroductIon
A strong and sound market for genetic resources and 
related goods generates strong incentives to biodiversity 
conservation. Nevertheless, the legal regime laid down 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) looks 
to bar the widespread use of  such assets and, conse-
quently, of  many possible socio-environmental benefits. 
At least partially, the negative incentive to the employ-
ment of  biodiverse inputs is the result of  unclear norms 
on access to resources, its ownership and downstream 
limits to use of  such assets. 
In 2010 during the COP-10, the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equi-
table Sharing of  Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted 
and was implemented on October 12th of  2014.1
This article discusses the legal aspects related to the 
economics of  biodiversity and genetic resources. It fo-
cuses the limits of  ownership rights implemented by the 
domestic law and its evaluation from the point of  view 
of  two disputing discourses: one oriented by sovereign 
developmental goals and other oriented to the maximi-
zation of  environmental protection.
2. the objectIves And prIncIples of the cbd
The CBD was signed on June 5th, 1992, and came 
into force on December 29th, 1993. By the adhesion of  
Andorra in May 20015, the figure of  196 Members was 
reached. The Convention was preceded by the creation 
by the United Nations Environmental Program in 1987 
of  a Committee, which consisted of  a working group to 
study the implementation of  an umbrella convention to 
bring together all the existing treaties related to the issue.
The negotiation process was polarized in three lines 
of  tension: between developed and developing coun-
tries, between transition (ex-communist) and developed 
1  In 2016 the Nagoya Protocol has 69 Parties. (CDB Secretariat).
countries, and between transition and developing coun-
tries. A main point put forward by these states was the 
need to grant special conditions to their further deve-
lopment, since both developed and transition countries 
historically depleted their ecosystems in order to grow. 
In economic terms, it puts the question of  an efficient and 
sustainable use of  natural resources – biodiversity inclu-
ded – as necessarily limited by distributive effects in terms 
of  rights to pollute and exploit non-renewable and re-
newable resources to developing countries. As generally 
perceived, the fair distribution of  wealth could be Pare-
to inferior in terms of  conservation, as far as benefits 
to developing countries are granted in a higher degree.
Therefore, some economic instruments devoted to 
correct inequalities have been put on the table and, as a 
consequence, the final text contemplates both the con-
servation of  biodiversity as far as the economic gains 
of  countries that have conserved their own biodiversity.
Accordingly to the negotiated concessions, the CBD 
Article 1 identifies two finalities: (a) the biodiversity 
conservation, and (b) the sustainable use and fair and 
equitable share of  benefits from the genetic resources. 
Transfer of  technology, funding and appropriate access, 
and inter alia, are instruments to implement fairness and 
equitability to the genetic resource benefit sharing2.
Considering the whole convention, Lakshman Gu-
ruswamy organizes it around three structuring principles: 
equity and resource transfers, conservation and sustaina-
ble use, and common but distinct responsibility. Althou-
gh they are not the only principles that could be correctly 
extracted from the CBD text, they are very revealing of  
the unsolved tension between developed and developing 
countries. The third principle links “equity and sustaina-
ble development together”3, as if  words would be enou-
gh to conciliate efficiency and distributive goals. Conse-
quently, it is legitimate to ask if  that is enough.
The analysis of  economic aspects of  conservation 
and of  the fair and equitable share of  the benefits is 
2 Nagoya Protocol Article 1 - “[t]he objective of  this Protocol 
is the fair and equitable sharing of  the benefits arising from the 
utilization of  genetic resources, including by appropriate access to 
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of  relevant technolo-
gies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to tech-
nologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the 
conservation of  biological diversity and the sustainable use of  its 
components”.
3 GURUSWAMI, Lakshman D.  International Environmental Law in 
a Nutshell. 2. ed. Eagan: Thomson-West, 2003. 
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fundamental to understand the incomplete conciliation 
of  CDB’s objectives.
3. bIodIversIty As A publIc good
CBD’s Preamble recognizes the “intrinsic value of  
biological diversity”. However, its definitions (Article 2) 
and operative clauses are far away from any ecocentric 
doctrine, as well as any moral commitment to other spe-
cies. As Birnie and Boyle point out:
The Preamble’s first recital begins by recognizing, 
without further explanation, ‘the intrinsic value of  
biodiversity’, as well as other values – ecological, 
genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, 
cultural, recreational, and esthetic. […] The other 
Preambular recitals refer to biodiversity, however, 
solely as a ‘resource’. The substantive articles define 
‘biological resources’ as including ‘genetic resources, 
organisms or parts thereof, populations or any other 
biotic component ecosystems with actual or potential use or 
value to humanity’, a more anthropocentric approach. The 
preamble reinforces this in noting that conservational 
use of  biodiversity is critical for meeting the food, 
health, and other needs of  the growing population.4
Nevertheless, the shyer and shallower approach of  
earlier conventions was clearly replaced by an integra-
ted view of  ecosystems, instead of  singular species or 
resources, as the unit to be conserved.
In fact, former conventions on the protection of  
species focus on economically useful animals or plants 
and propose regimes that control exploitation, such as 
hunting seasons and limited quotas5. The depletions fa-
ced were result of  overexploitation, not systemic crisis. 
Considering the interest to protect stocks as the primary 
goal of  such treaties, it is not hard to understand the 
substantial change brought by an approach that took 
whole ecosystems into account: as the exclusive goods 
resulting from harvesting were replaced by the nature 
itself, a complex public good – the biodiversity – occu-
4  BIRNIE, Patricia W.; BOYLE, Alan E. International Law and the 
Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 573
5  For example: Migratory Bird Treaty Act of  1918; International 
Convention for the Regulation of  Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 
1946; Convention on Wetlands of  International Importance, es-
pecially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 1971; Convention on the 
International Trade in Endangered Species of  Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES), 1973; Convention on the Conservation of  Migra-
tory Species of  Wild Animals, (CMS), Bonn, 1979; Convention of  
the Protection, Management and Development of  the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of  the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985. 
pies now the centre of  the stage.
In other words, the CBD does not protect directly 
the interests of  people entitled to harvest or to exploit 
the natural resources. It does protect the whole hu-
mankind – since biodiversity is defined as “a common 
concern”. So, the notion of  a collective or public good explains 
better the focus of  the CDB than the doctrines of  intrinsic value. 
This is not a statement without consequence though, 
since the acceptance of  the biodiversity value as being 
economic implies, necessarily, a less than absolute cha-
racter. As far as it is accepted as holding a relative va-
lue, the biodiversity can, legitimately, be exchanged for 
other goods.
Since biodiversity is legally defined as a public good, 
whose beneficiary is the whole humankind, its depletion 
or diminishment, although in favour of  any economic 
actor, represents a decrease of  utility to all other people. 
So, in order to understand how to protect biodiversity, 
it is necessary to understand the reasons of  its former 
destruction as well as the market mechanisms that can 
help to conserve it.
4. economIcs of bIodIversIty
Depletion of  biodiversity might result from a wide 
variety of  causes. To summarize, two usual sets will be 
remembered: (a) on one hand, Jared Diamond’s expres-
sion “quartet of  evil”, referring to habitat destruction, 
overkill, introduced species, and secondary extensions6; 
(b) on the other hand, Edward Wilson’s accrnym HI-
PPO, referring to habitat destruction, invasive species, 
pollution, population, and over harvesting.7
Gerd Winter follows a report from the German Ad-
visory Council on Global Change (GACGC) (2001) in 
adopting a syndromic view of  the environmental issues, 
which considers systemic dynamics that identifies the hu-
man economic activities and its effects on the environ-
ment.8 The document describes sixteen syndromes and 
six environmental problems. The identification of  these 
6 DIAMOND, J. M. “Normal” extinctions of  isolated popula-
tions. In: NITECKI, M. H. (Ed.). Extinctions. Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1984. p. 191-246.
7 WILSON, Edward O. The Future of  Life. New York: Knopf, 
2002. 
8 WINTER, Gerd. Introduction, In: WINTER, G. (Ed.). Multi-
level Governance of  Global: Environmental Change. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006.
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questions follows the criterion that they are predomina-
tely geographic but also regards the complexity of  cau-
ses and effects to identify the following clusters: climate 
change, ozone depletion, oceans at risk, biodiversity loss 
and deforestation, soil degradation, and freshwater. It is 
interesting to stress that even though biodiversity is nomi-
nally referred only to forest, it is obvious that oceanic and 
freshwater species are also included in the broad concept. 
Moreover, all of  the 16 syndromes affect biological diver-
sity and, within them, 14 strongly affect it.9 
Syndromic GACGC analysis also classifies them in 
three broad categories 
1. ‘Utilisation’ syndromes: Syndromes as a consequence 
of  inappropriate utilization of  natural resources as fac-
tors of  production;
2. ‘Development’ syndromes: Human/environment pro-
blems resulting from non-sustainable development pro-
cesses;
3. ‘Sink’ syndromes: Environmental degradation due 
to inappropriate disposal of  the effluents of  human so-
ciety.10
These categories are linked to three distinct eco-
nomic situations, which also embrace Diamond’s and 
Wilson’s sets of  environmental issues:
1. One or a limited set of  living elements of  an 
ecosystem is highly valuable and, therefore, it is exploi-
ted in rates higher than the natural reposition ones (uti-
lisation syndromes, overkill, overharvesting);
2. Land, water, or any other mineral resources are 
economically valuable and the natural ecosystem repre-
sents a barrier to their complete use (developmental 
syndromes, habitat destruction, deforestation, popula-
tion, secondary extensions); and
3. Externalities, such as pollution and invasive spe-
cies, occur due to the lack of  manifest preferences to 
conserve the ecosystems and their sites (sink syndro-
mes, pollution).
9 GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE. 
New Structures for Global Environmental Policy. London: Earthscan, 
2001. Available in: <http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2000_engl.
pdf>. Consulted on: 16 july 2015.  WINTER, Gerd. Introduction. 
In: WINTER, G. (Ed.). Multilevel Governance of  Global Environmental 
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
10 GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL 
CHANGE. New Structures for Global Environmental Policy. London: 
Earthscan, 2001. Available in: <http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_
jg2000_engl.pdf>. Consulted on: 16 July 2015.
The first item refers to the overexploitation pro-
blem, usually approached through the concept of  tra-
gedy of  commons. This expression, popularized by a 
Garrett Hardin’s essay to Science, refers itself  to a si-
tuation in which a resource is exploited by more than a 
single individual or organization and, as a result of  the 
selfish seeks for higher revenue; the use of  the resource 
extrapolates an optimal rate.11 Generally, there are two 
possible solutions: privatisation and regulation. Enclo-
sure and privatisation lead to a better utilisation of  the 
resource, since the owners are interested in obtaining 
the best possible revenues, which are expected to result 
from the self-interest in maximizing wealth. Regulatory 
solutions depend on the external intervention of  the 
state – as well as any other political entity – to distribute 
the shares and to control the respect of  the established 
rules. Self-regulatory and cooperative structures, such 
as traditional division of  labour as well as wealth and 
communitarian management, both approximate the 
solution to privatisation and regulation, since, on one 
hand, the socio-political arrangements create a collec-
tive actor who is able to seek optimal results; on the 
other hand, regulatory structures are committed to the 
group, and the management costs are supported by the 
own community.
Nevertheless, the approach to overexploitation, 
through the tragedy of  the commons concept, does not 
cover the whole issue of  biodiversity. The good protec-
ted by both privatizing and regulation solutions is not 
necessarily the biodiversity itself, but the optimal use of  
a natural resource, which almost always is not an entire 
ecosystem, but an element that can be individualized, 
captured, and incorporated to the economic human 
life. In other words, it can be useful to protect alliga-
tors, whose skin is a valuable asset to produce purses 
and shoes, but it cannot protect the natural niche of  
the species from its mass production in farms, far more 
efficient in getting financial revenues.
As a consequence, solutions to overexploitation pro-
blems cannot be regarded as a panacea to biodiversity 
protection, especially considering the integrated ecosys-
temic approach. Therefore, it is a very valuable instru-
ment to take care of  single species as well as biomes 
that cannot be easily farmed, both due to natural and 
11 HARDIN, Garrett. The tragedy of  commons, In: Science, 
n. 167. 1967. Available in: <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/re-
print/162/3859/1243.pdf>. Consulted on: 16 July 2008. 
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regulatory hardships, such as high seas and protected 
areas, respectively.
The second economic situation deals differently 
with biodiversity, especially regarding the destruction 
of  biomes in order to open new agricultural areas. If  
in some regions the deforestation has slowed down 
in recent years12, it is still increasing in some other re-
gions such as South-East Asia.13 Indeed, biodiversity is 
a function of  space occupied by ecosystems; therefore, 
the reduction of  areas that are natural habitats of  many 
species, implies the in situ destruction of  those species. 
The very wide scope covered by the definition of  
biodiversity as a “common concern of  humankind” 
that extends itself  to future generations does not help 
to find people and groups immediately interested in its 
conservation. As a pure public good, it is not provided 
under market conditions, since preferences do not get 
revealed.
The classical available solution is a commanding and 
controlling one. The lack of  a global state-like authori-
ty implies the absence of  international public policies, 
taxes, and enforcers, though. Therefore, CBD follows 
the pattern of  creating conventional obligations to sta-
tes, which would be responsible for the protection of  
ecosystems in their territories and for the cooperation 
to conserve biodiversity of  global commons. Never-
theless, operative clauses are very loose, full of  evasive 
formulations such as ‘as far as possible’, and ‘as appro-
priate’.
The protection of  biodiversity is, as a consequen-
ce, formally in the sole hands of  the states. Sometimes, 
though not every time, states, which are the only entities 
that actually hold all necessary features to set and im-
plement public policies, have specific economic or po-
litical interests in protecting natural areas and biodiver-
sity. Moreover, if  the benefits resulting from the public 
good supply are higher than the gains of  any alternative 
12 “Recent efforts have reduced Amazon deforestation in 2013 
by 70% below the historical 1996–2005 baseline of  19,600 km2 per 
year. Deforestation in the Cerrado has remained high. Deforestation 
has steadily declined in the Atlantic Forest despite a slight increase 
in 2013. “ UNITED NATIONS. Secretariat of  the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Global Biodiversity Outlook 4. Montréal: Secretar-
iat of  the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2014. p. 53. Available 
in: <www.cbd.int/GBO4>. Consulted on: 16 Jan. 2016.
13 UNITED NATIONS. Secretariat of  the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity. Global Biodiversity Outlook 4. Montréal: Secretariat of  
the Convention on Biological Diversity 2014. p. 52.   Available in: 
<www.cbd.int/GBO4>. Consulted on: 16 Jan. 2016. 
use plus the implementation costs, the efforts of  the 
organized civil society and the business sectors may be 
able to produce awareness as well as specific actions de-
voted to the environmental conservation.
The third situation is very close to the second one. 
The same public good – biodiversity – is at stake, the 
reason for the failure in offering it is not the same, thou-
gh. Waste disposal, pollution, and invasive species, whi-
ch can be regarded as a special kind of  pollution, are 
economic effects of  the human activity that are usually 
kept outside the accountancy of  productive and con-
sumptive processes or, in short, externalities.
If, on one hand, the menace to biodiversity due to a 
more intense economic use of  the land often depends 
on private ownership of  this resource, the externalities 
normally affect public goods, commons, or relative-
ly pulverized sets of  exclusive private goods. Indeed, 
the property rights induce their owners to protect the 
goods and to resist the negative effects from external 
activities as far as their costs are lower than the dama-
ges generated. In the condition of  absence or a high 
fragmentation of  the ownership (commons, pulverised 
property), public policies are necessary to deal with the 
problem.
To solve the externality problem, it is possible to 
foster the diminishment of  the costs of  internalization, 
or to enforce a command and control policy. For ins-
tance, special credit lines to acquisition of  anti-pollu-
tion filters is an action that makes easier to the polluter 
to cut down the negative effects of  his or her activity. 
Alternatively, contracting more inspectors to help the 
enforcement of  legal penalties can lead to the same re-
sults. In the presence of  two or more methods, a good 
manager shall choose a better mix in terms of  costs and 
benefits. Since the problem of  externalities admits in-
ductive instruments as possible solutions, it does not 
necessarily demand any kind of  international state to 
enforce policies and public decisions.
Nevertheless, since legal and social distribution of  
property is an important variable, it is also possible to 
increase the social pushes towards the control of  exter-
nalities through the assignment of  property rights. The 
clear attribution of  ownership rights over biodiversity 
is, therefore, a very strong instrument to mitigate nega-
tive externalities.
It does not mean that such property rights should 
necessarily be attributed to private owners. It is, of  cour-
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se, a possible solution, as well as the state ownership. 
Moreover, through the strengthening of  cooperative 
ties among pulverized owners, it is possible to unify the 
action. Cooperatives, federations of  indigenous people, 
and governmental action towards the empowerment 
of  local communities are good examples of  coordina-
ted and cooperative instruments to unify interests and 
action. A multiple owner, such as scattered group of  
peasants, can become a single entitled entity, such as a 
cooperative, that is far more able to identify and to fight 
those negative effects over their properties.
As far as biodiversity, or any of  its aspects, is ma-
rketable, the interest of  their owners can converge to 
its protection; therefore, some benefits thereof  shall be 
exclusive. 
As it has been discussed in the former topic, bio-
diversity is treated by the CBD as a public good that, 
at least in some aspects, is a pure one. Since it is well 
known, a pure public good cannot be exclusively ap-
propriated due to its own characteristics or to the high 
costs of  exclusivity. It is possible, moreover, that the le-
gal system prohibits the private appropriation of  some 
goods, which turn in legally colective. Nevertheless, the 
CBD did not lay down that all biodiversity and its as-
pects are legally public and, as a consequence, it can be 
appropriated by private or public entities. This interpre-
tation is corroborated by the Preamble, which expressly 
recognises a wide set of  value: “ecological, genetic, so-
cial, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recrea-
tional, and aesthetic”. Some of  these values only have 
some sense if  the goods are exclusive.
So, the CDB admits that biodiversity can be econo-
mically valuable – the so-called resources. As a resour-
ce, biodiversity (species, materials, and ecosystems) may 
generate sustainable economic activity, such as services 
and trade. For instance, ecotourism, voluntary dona-
tions to keep natural areas untouched, and traditional 
and indigenous handcraft trade, inter alia, are generally 
regarded as activities that foster the conservation of  na-
tural sites and biodiversity. The use of  genetic resources 
is a particular case of  it.
Summarizing, three economic problems affect the 
biodiversity: overexploitation of  natural resources, need 
for land and other natural resources, and externalities. 
The dynamics of  both overexploitation and externality 
problems can be, in some extension, dealt with owner-
ship assignments as well as actions to increase the value 
of  consistent products to conserve the biodiversity. If  
the value of  land or other resource is higher than the 
value of  the resource based on the biodiversity, the only 
solution is the regulation. In other words, market instru-
ments are not effective to prevent depletion of  ecosys-
tems unless some effective economic values result from 
it and they are not overwhelmed by the revenues from 
other uses of  land and other resources.
The meaning of  genetic resources as well as the dy-
namics of  its marketability is important to understand 
the effects of  access regulation and the share of  be-
nefits over protection and conservation of  biodiversity.
5. genetIc resources As economIc goods
The CBD is the first document that makes clear that 
access to genetic resources is not free but it is under the 
state sovereignty. As Article 15 (1) states, “the authority 
to determine access to genetic resources rests on the 
national governments and is subject to national legis-
lation”, and a mutually agreed price is to be paid for 
the access. The prior informed is the key to validate the 
contractual terms of  access.
CBD, Article 2, defines some important expressions 
as follows:
“Biological resources” includes genetic resources, 
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any 
other biotic component of  ecosystems with actual 
or potential use or value for humanity.
[…]
“Genetic material” means any material of  plant, 
animal, microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of  heredity.
“Genetic resources” means genetic material of  actual 
or potential value.
These definitions clearly set that genetic resources 
are material, tangible goods. The technical and scientific 
descriptions as well as the intellectual property (IP) ri-
ghts derived thereof  are no genetic resource. 
Interpreting the definition of  genetic material in 
an extensive manner, every material extracted from 
biological resources whose DNA was not destructed, 
also encompasses genetic material. Timber, fish, and a 
myriad of  plants and animals normally sold as commo-
dities, would be under restrictions of  access applied to 
biotechnological research or ex situ breeding. The defi-
CO
ST
A
, J
os
é 
A
ug
us
to
 F
on
to
ur
a; 
O
LI
V
E
IR
A
, L
iz
ian
e 
Pa
ix
ão
 S
ilv
a. 
K
ill
in
g 
th
e 
gr
ee
n 
go
os
e: 
leg
al 
lim
its
 to
 d
ev
elo
p 
an
d 
se
ll 
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
go
od
s. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
13
, n
. 2
, 2
01
6 
p.
 1
45
-1
58
154
nition of  “utilization of  genetic resources” was firmly 
embedded in the Nagoya Protocol. According to the 
article “Utilization of  genetic resources”, it is necessa-
ry to conduct research and development on the genetic 
and/or biochemical composition of  genetic resources, 
including through the use of  biotechnology as defined 
in Article 2 of  the Convention;”14
Such interpretation is to be kept away not only 
because its effects are dysfunctional, but because it is 
wrong. In fact, the concept of  “genetic resources” can-
not be equalized to “biological resources” one, since 
it would be nonsense to define two synonymous con-
cepts in the same text through the use of  equivalent 
terms. In fact, genetic resource is genetic material that 
is potentially and actually valuable as such, that means, 
“functional units of  heredity” which can be used to the 
reproduction of  specimens as well as to the synthetic 
production of  proteins or other substances.
So, there are just a few situations, mainly related to 
endangered species, in which the access to genetic re-
sources could, under special circumstances, imply ove-
rexploitation. Since the access is limited to samples, a 
high price of  the genetic resources would hardly derive 
from its scarcity. The price of  the samples would ac-
count nothing but the costs of  sample operations plus 
the payment of  the local material holders. This situation 
seems to be unfair to at least some important negotia-
ting parties of  CBD, especially to the underdeveloped 
countries backed by a developmental discourse.15 
From this material perspective, genetic resources are 
very close to immaterial goods, since its use to breeding 
or to synthesizing is not rivalrous. It means, plainly, that 
the use of  a genetic resource does not exclude others 
from the use of  an equivalent genetic resource to the 
same specific finalities. 
In fact, there is an important market on genetic ma-
terial from animals that held very special characteristics, 
such as awarded bulls, which does not depend on spe-
cial regulation to exist, since, in fact, the good at state 
14 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of  Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted at the CBD COP-
10 on 29 October 2010. Available in: <https://www.cbd.int/abs/
doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>.
15 See BIRNIE, Patricia W.; BOYLE, Alan E. International Law 
and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; GU-
RUSWAMI, Lakshman D.  International Environmental Law in a Nut-
shell. 2. ed. Eagan: Thomson-West, 2003.
has its production limited by the material condition of  a 
small group of  animals. It is to be clearly distinguished 
from the breeding or cropping of  certain species, who-
se genetic material could be, indistinctly, sampled throu-
gh the access to any of  its representative individuals. 
Attributing any special value to such genetic resources, 
depends on the creation and entitlement of  property 
rights in a fashion very close to the IP rights.
The most common argument to justify IP rights is 
based on the dynamics of  invention and production. 
This argument defends the need of  exclusive rights that 
derives from creation or invention and, consequently, 
is an incentive to further research and artistic activities. 
The social and legal creation of  an ownership system 
that encompasses immaterial objects is a necessary con-
dition to implement a market and, in the specific case of  
IP rights, is clearly aimed to it. 16
In fact, genetic resources are material; however, as 
it has been pointed out, they are not necessarily scarce 
in consequence of  their materiality. They are due to the 
fact that the information contained a DNA chemical 
support – or any functional unit of  heredity – that can 
be used in the ex situ breeding of  plants and animals or, 
otherwise, through biotechnological devices. Therefore, 
the original set of  individuals or parts thereof  can be 
multiplied and perpetuated without any need for further 
samples. Consequently, it gets clear that legal entitle-
ment to exclusive rights over genetic resources through 
the regulation of  the access is aimed to create scarcity 
and, consequently, a market for the access itself.
So, it is important to understand the motives and 
justifications for the creation of  such property system.
6. two dIscourses: rIght to development 
And effIcIent conservAtIon of bIodIversIty
At least two popular discourses are articulated in or-
der to justify the CBD clauses that restrict access. On 
one hand, the discourse of  right to development stands the 
well known narrative of  structural unbalance between 
North and South and the need to bridge the develop-
ment gap. The use of  genetic material from Southern 
16 PICCIOTTO, Sol; CAMPBELL, David.  Whose molecule is it 
anyway?: private and social perspectives on intellectual property. In: 
HUDSON, Alistair (Ed.). New perspectives on property law, obligations and 
restitution. London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2003.
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territories would be a kind of  colonial exploitation and 
a historical debt should be paid by industrialised coun-
tries. On the other hand, the discourse of  efficient conserva-
tion of  biodiversity states that the fair and equitable share 
of  benefits is primarily aimed to incentive developing 
countries to conserve their biodiversity, since they can 
perceive it as a future source of  revenues.
The discourse of  the right to development is built 
on the foundations set by a sharp structural division be-
tween developed and developing countries. In its more 
radical version, both the colonial and the free trade in-
ternational systems are regarded as tools that widen the 
developmental gap, since they favour the central econo-
mies – mainly the US – and eternilise the backwardness 
of  the third world. North-South relations are primarily 
conflictive and the objectives of  developing countries 
are to conquer rights and benefits in order to increase 
their power in the international arena until they equalise 
or surpass the power of  developed countries. The no-
tion of  fairness defended by its discourse focus on the 
retributive justice as well as the historical debts accumu-
lated during the colonial period; also, the biodiversity 
is an additional instrument to reach the objectives of  
increasing the national wealth and, consequently, power.
Therefore, the notion of  “fair and equitable share 
of  benefits”, following this discourse, cannot be establi-
shed by the market once the necessary fairness includes 
a compensatory dimension established by the retributi-
ve patterns of  justice. The own market is primarily seen 
as an instrument of  international oppression and domi-
nance by the North over the South and any increased 
interdependence means, essentially, more dependence.
Conversely, the discourse of  efficient conservation 
of  biodiversity presupposes that the CBD was signed 
to protect biological diversity. Consequently, the instru-
ments thereby adopted aim primarily the environmental 
protection. Therefore, it sets forth that, though states 
are members of  international organisations and respon-
sible for their acts, biodiversity is a public good, the rele-
vant stakeholders are all individuals encompassed by the 
concept of  “common concern of  humankind”17, and 
indigenous and local communities.
This perspective displaces states from the centre of  
17 See KISS, Alexandre-Charles. La notion de patrimoine commun 
de l’humanité. Boston: Brill, 1982. (Collected Courses of  the Hague 
Academy of  International Law. The Hague Academy of  Interna-
tional Law, v. 175).
the discussion; therefore, the North-South conflict be-
comes the greatest concern therewith. Since the indivi-
duals and the communities are stakeholders, the deve-
lopment itself  is assessed by their living standards and 
perceptions, and cannot be strongly equalized to the 
growth of  the state wealth anymore. It is necessary to 
stress that perception and discourse are not exclusive of  
the biodiversity or of  the environmental fields, but they 
are increasingly influent in international documents and 
norms, such as the Millennium Development Goals as 
well as the conditionalities of  international financing 
institutions.
The “fairness and equity” hold another in this dis-
course.18 At first, the regard is far more prospective, since 
there is no need to compensate former colonial inequali-
ties; future generations are the beneficiaries. The focus is 
on sharing of  benefits: individuals and communities are 
generally entitled to more biodiversity and, in the case of  
individuals and communities, to revenues from use and 
commercialization of  genetic resources and related IP ri-
ghts. It is in the market that genetic resources and downs-
tream products are traded. Consequently, the values of  
genetic resources are set in market transactions and can-
not be artificially higher. Regarding such condition, the 
fair and equitable share of  benefits has a very clear limit: 
the profitability of  the final products. 
Nevertheless, an effective use associated to a fair 
share of  benefits assures no protection to biodiversity. 
It depends on a feedback effect--stakeholders that are 
entitled to receive the revenues from the use of  genetic 
resources and products resulting from them shall: 
1. Regard the exploitation of  biodiversity as more 
profitable than rival uses of  the resource (agriculture, 
for instance), as it was described as the situation 2 of  
the economics of  biodiversity; and
2. Hold enough rights and/or power to bar the rival 
uses of  the resource.
18  The article 5.1 of  the Nagoya Protocol recognized “ […] ben-
efits arising from the utilization of  genetic resources as well as sub-
sequent applications and commercialization shall be shared in a fair 
and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that is the 
country of  origin of  such resources or a Party that has acquired the 
genetic resources in accordance with the Convention. Such sharing 
shall be upon mutually agreed terms.” Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of  Benefits 
Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, adopted at the CBD COP-10 on 29 October 2010. Available 
in https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf
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If  any of  these conditions are absent, there is no 
reason, according to the conservationist discourse, to 
implement and to enforce any property rights over ge-
netic resources.
Although several distributions of  ownership rights 
can be built, as it is to be discussed below, the CBD 
solution was to concentrate these rights in the sove-
reign entity. To justify it from the point of  view of  the 
conservationist discourse, it is possible to argue that the 
power of  states is, generally, enough to implement con-
servation programs (2nd condition) and it would be pos-
sible to identify it as a better actor to have concentrated 
therein, the rights over biodiversity.
Therefore, it is possible to assert that those discour-
ses may converge to the point that assures it is correct 
to attribute rights over genetic resources to the state of  
origin. The Nagoya Protocol explicitly specifies in its 
article 6 that:
In the exercise of  sovereign rights over natural re-
sources, and subject to domestic access and benefit-sha-
ring legislation or regulatory requirements, access to ge-
netic resources for their utilization shall be subject to 
the prior informed consent of  the Party providing such 
resources that is the country of  origin of  such resour-
ces or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in 
accordance with the Convention, unless otherwise de-
termined by that Party.19
Nevertheless, the harmony between them cannot be 
expected to be resilient.
The following table summarizes the main features 
of  both discourses:
Table 1 – Developmental and conservational discourses.
Developmental Conservational
Primary 
actors
States. Stakeholders. Indivi-
duals and local commu-
nities.
Biodi-
versity
Mean. End.
19 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of  Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted at the CBD COP-
10 on 29 October 2010. Available in: < https://www.cbd.int/abs/
doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>.
Developmental Conservational
Political 
as-
sump-
tions
North-South 
structural con-
flict
Focus on power.
Generalization of  con-
sensus and attention to 
non-state goals.
Focus on wealth and 
environment.
Main 
princi-
ple
Sovereignty. Biodiversity as common 
concern of  humankind.
Market Widens the de-
velopmental gap. 
Instrument of  
oppression.
Instrument to set and 
distribute the values of  
biodiversity and genetic 
resources.
Fair-
ness 
and 
equity
Compensation 
for the colonial 
inequalities.
Retributive jus-
tice.
Fair distribution among 
stakeholders.
Seek for efficient em-
powerment and legal 
entitlement.
Distributive justice.
Develo-
pment
National growth.
New interna-
tional balance 
of  wealth and 
power.
Sustainable develop-
ment.
Moreover, it is necessary to stress that sometimes 
some elements of  the conservational discourse are in-
corporated by the developmental one in two important 
ways: the internal empowerment and affirmation of  in-
dividuals and communities as decision makers on one 
hand, and the incorporation of  international conserva-
tion and developmental goals to government policies, 
on the other.
In fact, the radical distinction between the focus on 
primary actors as stakeholders and as states can be miti-
gated by a wider acceptance of  sub-national actors, go-
vernmental or from the civil society, as internal decision 
makers. Nevertheless, since the developmental discour-
se takes the presupposed structural distinction between 
developed and developing states as the fundamental 
feature of  international relations, the participation of  
sub-national actors are accepted as long as they sup-
port state policies. In other words, the discursive loci of  
anti-imperialism, needs to revert the balance of  power, 
the retributive justice against colonial powers/corpora-
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tions, the sovereign rights over natural resources, and 
the biodiversity. In order to increase national wealth and 
power, they are used as a criterion to screen the relevant 
and non-relevant internal actors, since the discursive le-
gitimacy of  political objectives as well as civil society ac-
tors shall pass the compatibility test to the general view. 
State discourses, such as the traditional developmental 
one, focus the national public entities and government 
capabilities, competences, and responsibilities to set and 
control the aims of  both international and internal po-
licies.
Regarding the conservational and developmental 
goals, the classical structural/developmental discourse 
tends to focus the growth of  national wealth and the 
increase of  national capabilities to produce technology. 
The welfare is a result from growth, closely related ur-
banization, industrialization, and focus the innovation 
and research. However, the theorists do not agree on 
distributive policies that vary according to leftist and 
rightist political tendencies20. At this point, it is neces-
sary to highlight that developmental goals, as defined 
in some recent international documents that follow the 
criterion of  UN Millennium Goals, are closer to distri-
butional and welfare concerns than to classical struc-
tural/developmental conceptions and beliefs. This last 
discourse, therefore, perceives environment and welfare 
concerns as secondary and instrumental.
Since the backwardness of  developing countries’ 
economies is attributed to the unbalanced structu-
re of  political and economic relations between North 
and South, and the state is the primary actor both in 
international and internal arenas, the participation of  
sub-national actors as well as the use of  international 
environmental and developmental criteria cannot be re-
garded as more than merely instrumental discursive loci 
that are temporarily incorporated in the narrow limits 
of  its convenience. In fact, there is no easy reconcilia-
tion between the analysed discourses.
Nevertheless, they get to a common point regarding 
the genetic resources: they shall be object of  an owner-
ship system that creates or increases their value. The 
reasons, however, are quite distinct. For one reason, the 
entitlement of  the state to exert control over the ac-
cess is a historically conquered right that shall be used 
20 BIELSCHOWSKY, Ricardo. Pensamento Econômico Brasileiro – 
1930/1964: o ciclo ideológico do desenvolvimento. 3. ed. Rio de 
Janeiro: Contraponto, 1996.
to make developing Southern states more wealthy and 
powerful in relative, not absolute, terms. For the other 
one, only effective results in terms of  biodiversity con-
servation justify the concentration in the hands of  the 
states’ exclusive right to authorize the access. 
These distinct fundamentals lead to different struc-
tures of  the ownership. Thus, the analysis of  the ge-
neral structure of  the right to allow or deny access to 
genetic goods in the system of  the CBD is, also, a ne-
cessary step to understand the influence of  each of  the-
se discourses and their effects over the conservation of  
biodiversity.
7. exclusIve control of Access As A property 
rIght
The CBD sets some internationally agreed charac-
teristics of  this ownership system and left the further 
development of  a most specific regulation to the Con-
ference of  Parties (COP) as well as, predominantly, to 
the states’ internal legal systems. The main aspects dealt 
with in the CBD are the entitlement of  rights over gene-
tic resources and some necessary steps to its legitimate 
transfer as well as some suggested means of  returning 
to the access conceivably allowed.
Indeed, property is the exclusive right to possess, en-
joy, and dispose a good. It means that a person, which 
can be an individual or a legal entity, is the owner. Con-
sequently, the right to exclude all other subjects from 
the possession and enjoyment of  such good is owned. 
A legal description of  a property right is to comprise, 
consequently, the subject (owner), the rights derived 
from the ownership (possession, enjoyment and dispo-
sal), and the means to protect and to exert these rights. 
The same structure can be employed to explain the ex-
clusive right to control access to natural resources.
The owners of  genetic resources are, primarily, the 
states. Following the legal institute of  permanent sove-
reignty over natural resources, reaffirmed in the CBD, 
Article 15 (1), the genetic resources’ owner is the state 
where they are found. Therefore, the state can legally 
establish a system to regulate the access.
The access to genetic resources shall be preceded by 
a prior informed consent, which means that any in situ 
research, sampling, or any other mean of  access to a 
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genetic resource cannot be considered legitimate unless 
the one who carries it has been authorized in the terms 
of  state legislation and by the competent authorities. 
According to Nagoya Protocol (article 6), the compe-
tent national authority, which comprehends multilevel 
governments and, occasionally, indigenous and local 
communities, consents the access during a reasonable 
period of  time in a certain geographic area through spe-
cific procedures and to a specific use, which cannot be 
changed or transferred to third parties without a new 
consent.
Additionally, the further use and benefits of  the ge-
netic resources are to be mutually established between 
the parties in an access agreement. As it has been poin-
ted out above, the consent to the access does not imply 
the permission to use associated knowledge or com-
mercialization.
The mutually agreed terms are the instrument in 
which the balance among the several aspects of  access 
and the use of  genetic resources are to be established 
between – or among – the state and the other stakehol-
ders. The Nagoya Protocol was intended to:
Establish clear rules and procedures for 
requiring and establishing mutually agreed 
terms. Such terms shall be set out in writing 
and may include, inter alia:
(i) A dispute settlement clause;
(ii) Terms on benefit-sharing, including in 
relation to intellectual property
rights;
(iii) Terms on subsequent third-party use, if  
any; and
(iv) Terms on changes of  intent, where 
applicable.21
The fair and equitable share of  benefits may embra-
ce both financial and non financial aspects. It may vary 
from the plain exchange of  samples for a price – a sale 
contract – to complex relational regimes that encom-
pass both monetary and non monetary obligations for 
each part. For instance: a price (monetary obligation) 
can be established for a certain period of  access time to 
a determined area for the sample collecting to a deter-
21 Article 6. 3 (g) in Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Re-
sources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of  Benefits Arising from 
Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 
at the CBD COP-10 on 29 October 2010. Available in: <https://
www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>.
mined range of  species (obligation to permit the access) 
with the help of  local guides (accessory services) that 
will be technologically processed in foreign laboratories 
with the presence of  technicians and researchers of  the 
country of  origin (accessory services, building capacity), 
being clearly agreed that the IP rights resulting from the 
research are to be shared in a determined proportion 
(obligation to perform common registry), and royalties 
are to be paid for downstream uses of  the resources 
(obligation to pay royalties). It is not difficult to imagine 
some far more complex regimes. The Nagoya Protocol 
detail a wide set of  10 suggested monetary, and 17 non-
-monetary benefits (Annex). All these lists are open.22 
An important question that arises from the access 
legal structure of  the genetic resources is the nature of  
the knowledge use restrictions and the IP rights that de-
rive from them. It is generally recognized that once the 
ownership over a material good resource is transferred, 
the related rights to possession, enjoyment, and disposal 
are transferred therewith. The modern structure of  pro-
perty rights, for the sake of  certainty and transparency, 
is normally concentrated in a single owner and regimes 
of  co-property are exceptional. It would be reasonable 
to believe that it is also the case with the rights and the 
products at the downstream of  a sold genetic resource.
Indeed, the co-property of  downstream rights, 
knowledge, and products extends the problem of  anti-
-commons far beyond the access regulation. The tran-
saction and enforcement costs will be very high and, 
possibly, many economic operations will become non 
viable. 
At first sight, the notions of  informed consent and 
the mutually agreed terms would exclude the transfe-
rence to third parties and the use of  the knowledge or 
intellectual property rights that result, in any sense, from 
a genetic resource; unless they are clearly established in 
those terms.23 The mere access authorization would not 
22 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of  Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted at the CBD COP-
10 on 29 October 2010. Available in: <https://www.cbd.int/abs/
doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>
23  “Recognising that access and benefit-sharing rarely take place 
between one provider and one user, but that more often it applies 
to a chain of  providers and users, terms on subsequent third party 
use are suggested”.(GLOWKA, Lyle; NORMAND, Valérie. The 
Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit -sharing: innovations in 
international environmental law. MORGERA, Elisa; BUCK, Mat-
thias; TSIOUMANI, Elsa. The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on access and 
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include the downstream24 uses unless they were clearly 
described therein. The Nagoya Protocol provided in the 
article 6 Access to genetic resources that 
[…] 3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 above, each Party 
requiring prior informed consent shall take the 
necessary legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, to:
[…]
(g) Establish clear rules and procedures for requiring 
and establishing mutually agreed terms. Such terms 
shall be set out in writing and may include, inter alia:
[…] (iii) Terms on subsequent third-party use, if  
any; and25
This is a possible interpretation, corroborated by the 
Nagoya Protocol, of  the notion of  fair and equitable 
share of  benefits. However, it shall not be used to cons-
truct a concept of  co-property of  the genetic resources, 
according to which the country of  origin would keep 
the right to prohibit further uses of  the genetic resour-
ces as if  the state had kept the enjoyment right, or a part 
thereof. It is far more reasonable to focus on possible 
compensatory rights that result from the rule of  fair 
and equitable share of  benefits, which basis could be 
any malicious behaviour that biases the consent and the 
agreed terms, as well as a use that could not be predic-
ted in the time when the terms were negotiated. 
8. fInAl conclusIons
The CBD was the result of  a compromise between 
countries primarily concerned about the conservation 
of  biodiversity through restrictions, the control of  hu-
man activities that would deplete ecosystems, and the 
countries in which the use of  available natural resources 
can be profitable. Since a consensus was not possible, 
the solution to harmonize the opposed interests was the 
benefit-sharing in perspective. Netherlands, 2013. pp 33)
24 “Downstream” activities include research (basic and applied) 
and development on genetic resources for both commercial and 
non-commercial purposes – i.e. activities that fall within the Pro-
tocol’s definition of  “utilization” of  genetic resources – and the 
commercialization of  products that are based on the utilisation of  
genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge”. (IEEP, Eco-
logic and GHK. Study to analyse legal and economic aspects of  
implementing the Nagoya Protocol on ABS in the European Union. 
Executive Summary of  the Final report for the European Com-
mission, DG Environment. Institute for European Environmental 
Policy, Brussels and London, 2012.)
25   Nagoya Protocol 
establishment of  instruments to motivate and to com-
pensate the costs of  conservation. The recognition of  
the permanent sovereignty over the genetic resources 
was an important part of  this solution, which, at first 
sight, would contemplate both the developmental and 
the conservational discourses.
 The definition of  the biodiversity as a “common 
concern of  humankind” as well as the character of  pu-
blic good that derives from its intrinsic value established 
legal foundations to the building of  an international 
system. Nevertheless, a legal definition is not enough 
to implement an effective regime: the protection and 
conservation depends on the comprehension of  the 
economic dynamics of  the uses of  the biodiversity as 
well as the resources associated to it. As it has been des-
cribed, increasing the market value of  biodiversity and 
products related to it – such as ecotourism and explora-
tion of  genetic resources – is a central incentive to the 
conservation.
Genetic resources, therefore, are a possible source 
of  revenue to states and local stakeholders. The recog-
nition by the CBD of  a sovereign right over such assets, 
which are functionally equivalent to property rights, was 
intended to increase their value through monopolistic 
control or oligopolies.
The justifications for the increase of  exclusivity of  
genetic resources, however, come from two distinct 
legitimating discourses. On one hand, a developmen-
tal one, which focus on the structural differences be-
tween Northern and Southern states and consider the 
sovereignty over genetic resources as an instrument of  
compensation from colonial exploitation. On the other 
hand, a conservational discourse, which considers that 
the primary aim of  CBD is the conservation of  the 
biodiversity and the rights over genetic resources, is an 
instrument thereof. The social articulation and the ma-
rket circulation of  wealth are instruments to increase 
incentives to conserve natural areas.
Specific regimes of  property over genetic resources 
are heavily affected by the discursive basis. The search 
for legitimacy in one of  both discourses deeply influen-
ces the design of  the ownership rights, especially in the 
domestic sphere, the most influent over the access con-
trol. Regimes conceived under the influence of  develo-
pment are more likely to overrate the values of  genetic 
resources. Consequently, it is possible that no market 
transactions related to genetic resources occur due to 
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the high transaction costs and anti-commons situation.
A market of  genetic resources is beneficial for all 
parties, since it is an incentive to the development of  
technology, a source of  revenue for states, enterprises, 
and local stakeholders. It is, of  course, necessary to 
grant the fair and equitable share of  benefits, but with 
no market, there are far less benefits to be shared. The-
refore, it is necessary to shape the ownership regimes 
carefully.
Both international and domestic legal principles as 
well as rules shall be designed in order to deny the ex-
tension of  the ownership rights beyond a reasonable 
reach, implemented by an efficient control of  access, 
and having transparent mutually agreed terms. The 
CBD system, which confers to the states the sovereign 
control over the genetic resources in their territories, 
is flexible enough to embed a very wide range of  in-
ternational and domestic regimes. Some sorts of  these 
regulatory frameworks happen to be risky to the own 
existence of  a market on genetic resources and their 
downstream products; therefore, they may jeopardize 
the own positive effects of  the biodiversity conserva-
tion, killing the rare green goose that was supposed to 
lay the golden eggs.
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